Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between
February 18, 2014 and September 4, 2014. This collection, written by the
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and
criminal matters, and then by subject matter and court.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and is
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point.
Preferred citation for the summaries below: Circuit Splits, 11 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2014).
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CIVIL
ADMIRALTY TORTS
Standard of care – Maritime rescue doctrine: Barlow v. Liberty Mar.
Corp., 746 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2014)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether the “maritime rescue doctrine”,
under which “a would-be rescuer, faced with an emergency, can only be
held contributory liable for injuries resulting from his rescue attempt, if
his conduct was reckless and wanton,” is the proper standard of care to be
applied to maritime torts. Id. at 524. The 4th Circuit determined that “the
wanton and reckless standard reflects the value society places upon rescue
as much as any desire to avoid a total defeat of recovery under common
law,” while the 9th and 5th Circuits held similarly. Id. at 525. The 2nd
Circuit noted that “the rescue doctrine originated at a time when
contributory negligence was an absolute bar to recovery.” Id. at 525. The
court noted that “maritime law has long used comparative fault in
resolving competing claims of negligence between the injured and the
tortfeasor, and today a majority of the states do the same.” Id. at 525–26.
The court reasoned that, because “under comparative negligence, of
course, even a negligent rescuer can recover . . . the principal justification
for the rescue doctrine — encouraging rescue — has largely disappeared.”
Id. at 526. Thus, the 2nd Circuit distinguished itself and concluded that
the maritime standard of care “in comparative negligence jurisdictions is
that rescuers must act reasonably under emergency circumstances.” Id.
BANKRUPTCY
Final Judgment Rule – Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005: Bullard v. Hyde Park Sav. Bank (In re Bullard),
752 F.3d 483 (1st Cir. 2014)
The 1st Circuit considered whether a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s
(“BAP”) “order denying confirmation is per se not a final order appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) and can be final, but should be
presumed to be final unless the appellee can show otherwise.” Id. at 486.
The court noted that jurisdictional statutes should not be construed too
liberally, because then “parties will run to the court of appeals for higher
advice at every stage of the bankruptcy proceedings.” Id. However, the
court recognized that if statutes were construed too stringently, it would
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“require[e] case-by-case, fact-intensive review . . . .” Id. The 1st Circuit
held, consistent with the 2nd, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th Circuits, that “an
intermediate appellate court’s affirmance of a bankruptcy court’s denial of
confirmation of a reorganization plan is not a final order appealable under
§ 158(d)(1) so long as the debtor remains free to propose an amended
plan.” Id. at 489.
Orders Denying Stay of Relief – Appealability: Pinpoint IT Services,
LLC v. Rivera (In re Atlas IT Exp. Corp.), 761 F.3d 177 (1st Cir. 2014).
The 1st Circuit addressed whether orders denying stays of relief are
appealable as final judgments. Id. at 182. The court started by noting that
all of the Circuits have agreed that orders granting stays relief are final and
appealable, however there is a circuit split regarding whether the denial of
a stay is final and appealable. Id. at 183. The 1st Circuit refers to the
majority approach as “the blanket rule,” which categorically allows for
appeals of orders either granting or denying stays. Id. However, the
minority view, exemplified by the 3rd Circuit, takes into account the status
of the case itself to determine if the order is truly “final,” or whether the
District Court below can still engage in considerable activity. Id. The 1st
Circuit ultimately sided with the 3rd Circuit’s approach, and concluded
that appealability is determined by “whether that edict definitively decided
a discrete, fully-developed issue that is not reviewable somewhere else.”
Id. at 185.
Secured Status Determination – U.S.C. § 506(b): Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am. v. SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC (In re SW Boston Hotel
Venture, LLC), 748 F.3d 393 (1st Cir. 2014)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether to “uphold the bankruptcy court’s
application of the flexible approach” in determining secured status and
collateral value in a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 405. The court noted
that “several circuits,” including the 5th Circuit, have adopted a “singlevaluation” approach, where the determination of over-security for § 506(b)
purposes always occurs at a fixed point in time. Id. The court noted that
“other circuits,” including the 11th Circuit, have adopted a “‘flexible’
approach, giving the bankruptcy court discretion to determine the
appropriate measuring date based on the circumstances of the case.” Id.
In addition, the court recognized that the Bankruptcy Court adopted the
flexible approach. Id. The court noted that “neither § 506(b)’s language,
nor its legislative history, nor the bankruptcy rules define the measuring
date of post-petition interest” which suggests flexibility. Id. The 1st
Circuit concluded that “at least in the circumstances presented here, a
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bankruptcy court, may, in its discretion, adopt a flexible approach.” Id.
Thus, the 1st Circuit agreed with the 11th Circuit, and held that “under the
particular facts presented in this case, the bankruptcy court did not err in
adopting a flexible approach for determining oversecured status.”
Standing – Parties in Interest: In re C.P. Hall Co. v. Columbia Casualty
Co., 750 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2014)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), defining
parties in interest, entitles a debtor’s excess insurer the right to intervene
in a bankruptcy settlement. Id. at 661. The Court noted that the 2nd, 10th,
and 11th Circuits found that the interest of an entity that “may suffer
collateral damage from a bankruptcy proceeding” is too remote to entitle
that entity to intervene in a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 661. The court
distinguished the facts of this case from opinions in the 3rd and 9th
Circuits, where those courts found that insurers of the debtor were entitled
to object to settlements because their injuries were more than probabilistic
and the bankruptcy settlements in question affected the insurer’s rights. Id
at 662-63. Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded, in line with the 2nd, 10th, and
11th Circuits, that because the excess insurer’s loss was too remote and
the excess insurer was not a party in interest as defined by 11 U.S.C.
§ 1109(b), there was no right to intervene in a settlement negotiation
between two other parties. Id. 661–62.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Appellate Jurisdiction – Collateral Order Doctrine: Cobra Natural
Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82 (4th
Cir. 2014)
The 4th Circuit addressed “whether a Commission decision granting
temporary reinstatement to a coal miner is immediately appealable by the
coal operator under the collateral order doctrine.” Id. at 88. The court
recognized that the collateral order doctrine only allows the immediate
review of important issues that have been definitively decided and would
be unreviewable after entering final judgment. Id. at 86. The court noted
that the 11th and 7th Circuits determined that appellate jurisdiction is
appropriate. Id. However, the court disagreed with the 11th and 7th
Circuits as the 11th Circuit rendered its decision more than two decades
ago and the 7th Circuit’s resolution was resolved in a somewhat cursory
fashion. Id. Thus the 4th Circuit concluded “the collateral order doctrine
does not permit an interlocutory review of the proceedings below.” Id. at
92.
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Banking Law – Citizenship: Rouse v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 747 F.3d
707 (9th Cir. 2014)
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 1348, a
national bank is a citizen of both the state in which its principal place of
business is located and the state where its main office is located as
designated in the bank’s articles of association.” Id. at 709. The court
noted that the Supreme Court previously held that a national bank is a
citizen of the “state where its main office is located.” Id. at 710. Further,
the court noted that, following the Supreme Court decision, the 8th Circuit
held that “a national bank is ‘located’ only in the state in which its main
office is located.” Id. at 712. While the 1st, 6th and 7th Circuits agree that
banks can only be citizens of the state in which its main office is located,
the 2nd and 4th Circuits have found that national banks may be citizens of
two or more states. Id. at 710-11. The 9th Circuit posited that when
“interpreting congressional intent, we look to the time of Congress’s
enactment of the legislation.” Id. at 714. Agreeing with the 1st, 6th, and
7th Circuits, the 9th Circuit concluded that “a national bank is a citizen of
the state in which its main office is located.” Id. at 709.
First to File Bar – Pending Action: United States ex rel. Shea v. Cellco
P’ship, 748 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether the first-to-file bar applies only
while the first-filed action remains pending. Id. at 343. The court stated
that the 4th, 7th, 10th Circuits have held that the first-to-file bar only
applies when the first-filed action remains pending. Id. Further, the court
noted that the 7th and 10th Circuits only addressed the issue in dicta and
that the 4th Circuit had twice considered the meaning of “pending” as a
controlling issue but that it had based its decision on the 10th Circuit’s
understanding. Id. at 344. Interpreting the applicable statute, the court
reasoned that the plain meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) “makes clear
that the bar commences when a person brings an action under this
subsection and thence forth bars any action based on the facts underlying
the pending action.” Id. The D.C. Circuit rejected the reasoning of the 4th,
7th, and 10th Circuits, and held that “the first-to-file bar applies even if the
initial action is no longer pending,” because the court interpreted
“‘pending’ in the statutory phrase ‘pending action’ to distinguish the
earlier-filed action from the later-filed action.” Id. at 344.
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Guilty Pleas – Authorization: United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886
(7th Cir. 2014)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether magistrate judges can accept
guilty pleas under the Federal Magistrates Act with a defendant’s consent.
Id. at 888. The court noted that the 4th, 10th and 11th Circuits found that
magistrate judges have the authority to accept felony guilty pleas. Id. at
891. The 7th Circuit found that while a magistrate judge may conduct a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) colloquy for the purpose of making a report or
recommendation, a magistrate judge cannot accept a defendant’s guilty
pleas because it violates the Federal Magistrates Act. Id. The court
disagreed with the 4th, 10th, and 11th Circuits’ statements that “Congress
intended to give federal judges significant leeway to experiment with
possible improvements in the efficiency of the judicial process.” Id. Thus
the 7th Circuit concluded that magistrate judges violate the Federal
Magistrate Act by accepting guilty pleas. Id.
Justiciability – Exhaustion of Remedies: Rundgren v. Wash. Mut.
Bank, FA, 760 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2014)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether mortgage borrowers claims are
affirmative defenses that are exempt from Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act’s (“FIRREA”) exhaustion requirement.
Id. at 1062–63. The court noted that the 1st Circuit determined that “it did
not matter ‘who happens to be the plaintiff’ because ‘[t]he purpose of the
exhaustion requirement is to make persons with claims against bank funds
or property submit them promptly in a single administrative forum.’” Id.
at 1063. The 9th Circuit disagreed with the 1st Circuit because “a
borrower’s claim that the bank is not entitled to foreclose due to past
misdeeds plainly satisfies the criterion of being a ‘claim relating to any act
or omission’ of a bank.” Id. at 1064. Thus the 9th Circuit concluded that
the mortgage borrowers claims were not affirmative defenses exempt from
FIRREA’s exhaustion requirement. Id.
Tax Deficiency – Third Party Intervention in Citizens’ Deficiency
Proceedings: Huff v. Comm’r of IRS, 743 F.3d 790 (11th Cir. 2014)
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) correctly brought a deficiency action against taxpayers that had
paid their taxes to the Virgin Islands stating that the taxpayers were not
bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands. Id. The Virgin Islands moved
to intervene but the Tax Court denied intervention and appeal was filed.
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Id. The 11th Circuit noted that the Tax Court has previously stated that
the Virgin Islands attempt to intervene using Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) does
not allow intervention as a matter of right. Id. at 794. Additionally, the
court determined that the Virgin Islands have not been found to have a
qualifying interest that allows such intervention in delinquency
proceedings such as these. Id. The Court noted that the 3rd and 8th
Circuits have reached the same conclusion, but argued that the Virgin
Islands intervention should instead be required to satisfy Rule 24(b)(3),
requiring a court to decide whether “the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Id. 795. In
contrast, the 4th Circuit held that the Tax Court used the correct permissive
intervention standard and reached a proper denial of intervention. Id. The
11th Circuit agreed with the 3rd and 8th Circuits and concluded that Rule
24(a)(2) is the proper standard for deciding if intervention by a third party
is proper. Id.

CIVIL RIGHTS

Fair Housing Act – Disparate Impact Claims: Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275 (5th
Cir. 2014)
The 5th Circuit addressed the “correct legal standard to be applied in
disparate impact claims under the [Fair Housing Act (“FHA”)]”. Id. at
276. The court noted that its “sister circuits have applied multiple different
legal standards to similar claims under the FHA.” Id. at 281. The court
recognized that the 2nd and 3rd Circuits “require a defendant to bear the
burden of proving that there are no less discriminatory alternatives to a
practice that results in a disparate impact,” while the 8th and 10th Circuits
“place the burden on the plaintiff to prove that there are less discriminatory
alternatives.” Id. In addition, the court noted that the 7th Circuit “applied
a four-factor balancing test rather than burden-shifting, while the 4th and
6th Circuits “applied a four-factor balancing test to public defendants and
a burden-shifting approach to private defendants.” Id. The 5th Circuit
followed the 2nd and 3rd Circuits and adopted a “three-step burdenshifting approach” because “these standards are in accordance with
disparate impact principles and precedent.” Id.
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COMMUNICATIONS LAW

Definitions – Federal Communications Act: J&J Sports Prods. v.
Mandell Family Ventures, LLC., 751 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2014)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether § 605(a) of the Federal
Communication Act (“FCA”) encompasses a receipt or inception of
communications by wire from a cable system. Id. at 351. The court noted
that the 3rd and 7th Circuits held that the 2nd Circuit’s interpretation of
§ 605(a) “unacceptably blurs the line between radio and wire
communications, which are separately defined terms that both refer to
instrumentalities incidental to transmission of the communication.” Id. at
352 (internal quotations omitted). The court noted that the 2nd Circuit
concluded that the “definition for radio communications extends to all
instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services . . . ” Id. (internal
citations omitted). Thus, the 5th Circuit joined the 3rd and 7th Circuits in
holding that § 605(a) does not encompass receipt of communications by
wire from a cable system. Id. at 353.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Civil Rights – Remedies against State Actors: Campbell v. Forest
Pres. Dist., 752 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2014)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private as well as
public contracts, “provide[s] a remedy against state actors independent of
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 667. The court noted that the 9th Circuit
determined that, although “the amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not
expressly authorize private claimants to sue state actors directly,” the
Supreme Court intended to imply a remedy because of the Court’s
previously inferred remedy against private actors. Id. at 671. The 7th
Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit and noted that Congress’s creation
of a specific remedy against state actors under § 1983 counsels against
inferring a remedy against them under § 1981. Id. The 7th Circuit joined
the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 10th Circuits in holding that “§ 1983 remains the
exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 committed by state actors.” Id.
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First Amendment – Free Speech: Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13507 (5th Cir.
2014)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether the decision of a governmental
board to reject a specialty license plate containing a Confederate battle flag
is government speech or private speech. Id. at *10. The court noted that
the 6th Circuit “held that a specialty license plate was governmental
speech.” Id. at *19. The 5th Circuit observed that the 6th Circuit’s
conclusion made it the sole outlier among the circuits. Id. The court noted
that the 4th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Circuits have all held that specialty license
plates were private speech. Id. Furthermore, the court distinguished the
case before the 6th Circuit because it involved a license plate specifically
commissioned by the state government. Id. Thus, the court concluded
that specialty license plates are private speech. Id. at *21.
Second Amendment– Concealed Weapons: Peruta v. County of San
Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether or not a state may require an
individual to apply for a permit to carry a concealed weapon or if that
requirement violates a citizen’s right to bear arms. Id. at 1147. The court
noted that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Circuits have held that as long as a state
can show a “justifiable need” for restrictive permit requirements, they do
not violate a citizen’s right to bear arms. Id. However, the 10th Circuit
disagreed and sided with the 7th Circuit’s interpretation that statutes
requiring a citizen to “show cause” run afoul of the privileges and
protections provided for by the Second Amendment. Id. at 1149. The 10th
Circuit recognized the right of an individual to bear arms, which it
interpreted as the right to carry a weapon in case of confrontation. Id. at
1179.
CONTRACTS
Forum Selection Clause – Choice of Law: Jackson v. Payday Fin., 2014
U.S. App. LEXIS 16257 (7th Cir. 2014)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether a forum selection clause in a
contract was valid. Id. at *16. The court noted that where there is no
controlling federal statute the court is “without clear guidance from the
Supreme Court; It has not yet decided the Erie issue of which law governs
when, as here, a federal court, sitting in diversity, evaluates a forum
selection clause in the absence of a controlling federal statute.” Id. at *18–
19 (internal quotations marks omitted). The court noted the 8th, 9th, 5th,
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2nd, 11th, and 3rd Circuits “hold that the enforceability of a forum
selection clause implicates federal procedure and should therefore be
governed by federal law.” Id. at *19 (internal quotations marks omitted).
The 7th Circuit took a different approach, stating that “the law designated
in the choice of law clause would be used to determine the validity of the
forum selection clause.” Id. at *19. Thus, the 7th Circuit rejected the
reasoning of the majority of circuits and deferred to the law stated in the
forum selection clause of a contract where there is no controlling federal
statute in diversity jurisdiction cases. Id.
COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright Infringement – Mobile Phone Software: Oracle Am., Inc.
v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (9th Cir. 2014)
The 9th Circuit addressed what test should be “employed when
attempting to draw the line between what is protectable expression and
what is not[,]” specifically attempting to define whether the “non-literal
elements of a computer program constitute protectable expression.” Id. at.
1357. The 6th Circuit found that principles or merger and scenes a faire
should not be assessed in the infringement analysis but rather “as a
component of copyrightability.” Id. The 9th Circuit held that “scenes a
faire [is] a defense to infringement rather than . . . a barrier to
copyrightability.” Id. The 1st Circuit found that “methods of operation
are means by which a user operates something and any words used to
effectuate that operation are unprotected expression.” Id. at 1357.
Alternatively, the 3rd Circuit found that “everything not necessary to the
purpose or function of a work is expression.” Id. The 2nd Circuit
considered the merger doctrine in order to determine if actionable
infringement has occurred, “rather than whether a copyright is valid.” Id.
The 9th Circuit joined the 2nd Circuit, holding that “although an element
of a work may be characterized as a method of operation, that element may
nevertheless contain expression that is eligible for copyright protection,”
and rejecting the “assumption that, once any separable idea can be
identified in a computer program everything else must be protectable
expression, on grounds that more than one idea may be embodied in any
particular program.” Id.
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DEBT COLLECTION LAW
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act– Disputed Debt: Clark v. Absolute
Collection Serv., 741 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2014)
The 4th Circuit addressed whether the Fair Debt Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1692(g)(a) permits a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt
orally, or whether it imposes a writing requirement. Id. at 489. The court
noted that the 3rd Circuit has held that there is a writing requirement to
satisfy the statute. Id. In addition, the 3rd Circuit considered the
legislative purpose behind the statute. Id. However, the 4th Circuit
stressed the importance of separation of power and plain language. Id.
The Court noted that its sole purpose to enforce non-absurd language in
statutes according to the text. Id. at 491. The 4th Circuit, joining the 2nd
and 9th Circuits, concluded that § 1692(g)(a) does not require the debt
dispute to be in writing. Id.
EDUCATION LAW
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act – Stay-Put Provision: M.R.
v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2014)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether the stay-put provision provides
for “the right to interim funding, if applicable, [to] extend[ ] through the
time of a judicial appeal.” Id. at 115. The court noted that the D.C. Circuit
determined that Congress did not intend stay-put financing to cover federal
appellate review, while the 9th Circuit found that stay-put obligation
extends through appeals decision. Id. at 125. The 3rd Circuit reasoned
that the “text [of § 1415(j)] is broadly written to encompass the pendency
of any proceeding conducted pursuant to this section.” Id. The 3rd Circuit
agreed with the 9th Circuit and concluded that “the statutory language and
the ‘protective purposes’ of the stay-put provision lead to the conclusion
that Congress intended stay-put placement to remain in effect through the
final resolution of the dispute.” Id.
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
False Claims Act – Employer Liability: Foglia v. Renal Ventures
Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2014)
The 3rd Circuit addressed what a plaintiff must show at the pleading
stage to satisfy the “particularity” requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) in
the context of a claim under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729 et
seq. Id. at 155. The court noted that the “[t]he 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th
Circuits have held that a plaintiff must show ‘representative samples’ of
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the alleged fraudulent conduct, specifying the time, place, and content of
the acts and the identity of the actors,” while, “[t]he 1st, 5th, and 9th
Circuits . . . have taken a more nuanced approach regarding the
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) by holding that it is
sufficient for a plaintiff to allege ‘particular details of a scheme to submit
false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that
claims were actually submitted.’” Id. at 156. The 3rd Circuit agreed with
the 1st, 5th, and 9th Circuits, and held that the more “nuanced” approach
provides defendants fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 157.
Family and Medical Leave Act – Leave to Care for a Family Member:
Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2014)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether or not providing physical and
emotional care for a terminally ill person constituted “caring for” within
the meaning of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1)(C), even though the treatment was not part of the regimented
care. Id. at 840. The court noted that the 1st and 9th Circuits determined
that “care” had to be related to ongoing medical treatment. Id. at 842. The
court disagreed with the 1st and 9th Circuits, as the circumstances
involved in both cases cited were distinguishable, thus creating a circuit
split. Id. The 7th Circuit concluded that so long as the employee attends
to a family member’s basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional needs, that
employee is caring for the family member within the meaning of the
FMLA, even if that care is not part of ongoing treatment of the condition.
Id.
Fair Labor Standards Act – Offsetting Overtime Payment: Haro v.
City of Los Angeles, 745 F. 3d 1249 (1st Cir. 2014)
The 1st Circuit addressed how previously-paid overtime should be
offset under the Fair Labor Standard Act, 29 U.S.C § 207(a) by either
using a week-by-week calculation or by using a cumulative approach. Id.
at 1261. The court noted that the 6th and 7th Circuits determined that a
week-by-week offset should be used to calculate offsets, while the 5th and
11th Circuits found that “previously-paid overtime can be cumulatively
offset against the damages calculated.” Id. at 1255, 1260. The 1st Circuit
agreed with the 6th and 7th Circuits in finding that under 29 U.S.C
§ 207(a), “compensation already paid for work done within one workweek
should not be transferrable and offset against overtime due in another
workweek.” Id. at 1260. The court disagreed with the 5th and 11th
Circuits, as the case law set forth supporting the cumulative approach was
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either summarily decided or inapposite in this case. Id. Thus the 1st
Circuit concluded that previously-paid overtime should be offset using a
week-by-week calculation. Id. at 1261.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Critical Habitats – Endangered Species Act: San Luis & Delta-Mendota
Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2014)
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether [National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”)] applies to the designation of critical habitats under Section
4 of the [Endangered Species Act].” Id. at 649, n. 50. The court held that
NEPA is not applicable to the designation of a critical habitat under the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (“ESA”) Id. at 648. The 9th
Circuit stated that the procedures already in place for designating a critical
habitat under the ESA were sufficient and requiring compliance with
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) when designating would be
superfluous. Id. at 649. The 10th Circuit disagreed with the holdings of
the 9th Circuit whereby the 9th Circuit stated the NEPA was not necessary
to designate critical habitats. Id. at 649, n. 50. The 9th Circuit noted that
all of the goals of the NEPA, such as public notice, were incorporated into
the procedures for designation of critical habitats under Section 4 of the
ESA. Id. at 649. The 9th Circuit concluded that the National
Environmental Policy Act was not applicable to designation of critical
habitats. Id.
IMMIGRATION
Administrative Agency Discretion – Immigration and Naturalization
Act: Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2014)
The 5th Circuit addressed the question of whether the Immigration
and Naturalization Act (“INA”) is sufficiently ambiguous to allow for the
consideration of additional evidence in accordance with the Attorney
General’s three-step approach to determining crimes involving moral
turpitude. Id. at 200. The court noted that while the 3rd, 4th, 9th and 11th
Circuits withheld deference and determined that the statute’s language was
unambiguous, the 7th and 8th Circuits found the opposite. Id. The 5th
Circuit agreed with the 3rd, 4th, 9th and 11th Circuits, reasoning that, “if
Congress intended for immigration judges to consider extrinsic evidence
to classify a conviction as a crime of moral turpitude, the legislators would
have included language to that effect.” Id. at 201. In so reasoning, the
court disagreed with the 7th and 8th Circuits, noting that “Congress is
aware of the universal judicial interpretation of the ‘convicted of’ clause
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of § 212, and we can assume that Congress expects us to abide by that
construction.” Id. at 203. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that its own
precedent prohibits an inquiry into extrinsic evidence, and that such
inquiries are “only viable when Congress has not spoken directly to the
statutory question before the court.” Id. at 205.
Statutory Interpretation – Immigration and Nationality Act: Bautista
v. AG of the U.S., 744 F.3d 54 (3d Cir. 2014)
The 3rd Circuit addressed the issue of whether the jurisdictional
element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) is necessary for a state attempted arson conviction to qualify as
an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(43)(E). Id. at 64. The court
noted that the 5th, 7th, and 9th Circuits determined that Congress intended
that the “interstate commerce” element of the federal statute supports the
notion that the jurisdictional requirement is distinct from the substantive
nature of the offense. Id. at 72. The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 5th, 7th,
and 9th Circuits in finding that the penultimate sentence of § 101(a)(43)(E)
conveys Congress’s intent to qualify more than a negligible number of
state convictions as aggravated felonies. Id. at 64. However, the court
disagreed with the 5th, 7th, and 9th Circuits, and concluded that “the
structure of § 101(a)(43)(E) evidences Congress’s intent to accomplish
that objective through the use of ‘described in’ rather than ‘defined in’ as
a means to always discard jurisdictional elements of federal felonies for
the purposes of § 101(a)(43)(E).” Id. The court noted that if Congress had
intended to exclude the jurisdictional element of all federal statutes from
the categorical approach analysis, it could simply have included a different
penultimate sentence stating that jurisdictional elements should be
ignored, as it clearly expressed its directives regarding specific subsections
elsewhere in § 101(a)(43). Id. The 3rd Circuit concluded since the statute
of the plaintiff’s arson conviction did not contain the jurisdictional element
of § 833(i), the conviction is not an aggravated felony under
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i) because the state statute does not require a nexus with
interstate commerce. Id. at 68.
Waiver of Status Post Conviction – Eligibility of Waiver: Roberts v.
Holder, 745 F. 3d 928 (8th Cir. 2014)
The 8th Circuit addressed whether the aggravated felony bar to a
waiver of aggravated felony conviction found in 8 U.S.C. § 112(h) applies
to alien immigrants who attain Lawful Permanent Resident status postadmission to the United States. Id. at 933. The court noted that the 3rd,
4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits found that a person must have entered or been
admitted to the Unites States as a Lawful Permanent Resident in order for
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the aggravated felony bar to apply to them. Id. at 932 The 8th Circuit
disagreed with the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits, in finding that the
Bureau of Immigration Appeals’ reasonable construction of the statute is
correct and that relief is unavailable for any alien convicted of an
aggravated felony as a Lawful Permanent Resident, regardless of how such
status was acquired. Id. The court disagreed with the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and
11th Circuits as the ambiguity in the immigration statutes makes the
Bureau of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation reasonable. Id. Thus the
8th Circuit concluded that the defendant was not entitled to review of his
status. Id. at 935.
LABOR LAW
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 – Statute of
Limitations: Fish v. Greatbanc Trust Co., 749 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2014)
The 7th Circuit addressed what constitutes “actual knowledge” in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s (“ERISA”) statute of
limitations, which “bars an action if it is commenced more than three years
after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the
breach or violation.” Id. at 678. The court noted that the 3rd Circuit
determined that the three-year bar only applies when “the plaintiff knows
not only the facts underlying the alleged violation but also that those facts
constitute a violation under ERISA,” while the 5th Circuit “do[es] not
require knowledge that the law was violated but still demand[s] actual
knowledge of all material facts necessary to understand that some claim
exists.” Id. at 679 (citations omitted). The court disagreed with the 3rd
Circuit’s strict test, despite its acknowledging that a strong textual
argument can be made for it because the statute requires “actual
knowledge of the breach of violation.” Id. at 679. The 7th Circuit joined
the 5th Circuit in holding that actual knowledge requires “knowledge of
all material facts but not knowledge of every detail or knowledge of
illegality.” Id.
TAX LAW
Civil Settlement – Deductibility: Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v.
United States, No. 13-2144, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15536 (1st Cir.
2014)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether, in determining the tax treatment
of a civil settlement under the False Claims Act (“FCA”) for deduction
purposes, “a court may consider factors beyond the mere presence or
absence of a tax characterization agreement between the government and
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the settling party.” Id. at *1–*2. The court noted that in a similar case
involving an FCA settlement agreement, the 9th Circuit found that the
characterization and purpose of the settlement agreement determined
whether or not parties intended the payment to compensate the
government or punish the taxpayer. Id. at *11. However, the 1st Circuit
disagreed with this holding, and instead found that to focus solely on the
intent of the parties “would be an anomaly in tax law,” where in
formulating tax characterizations, courts must focus on the “economic
reality of the particular transaction.” Id. at *12. Thus, the 1st Circuit
disagreed with the 9th Circuit and held that “in determining the tax
treatment of an FCA civil settlement, a court may consider factors beyond
the mere presence or absence of a tax characterization agreement between
the government and the settling party.” Id. at *17.
Notice Requirement – IRS Summons: Jewell v. United States, 749
F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2014)
The 10th Circuit addressed the issue of “how to interpret the notice
requirement.” Id. at 1297. Four other circuit courts have “acknowledged
Powell, but have declined to enforce the 23-day requirement as
mandatory.” Id. at 1300. The 1st Circuit has required the government to
comply with all of the “required administrative steps,” but ignores that
“the 23-day notice is one the administrative steps required in the tax code.”
Id. The 2nd, 6th, and 11th Circuits “assume equitable power to excuse the
notice defect if the taxpayer was not prejudiced. Id. The 5th Circuit
declined to apply Powell when the IRS violated a separate provision,” 26
U.S.C. § 7609(d). Id. The 10th Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s
decision in Powell by stating that if the “IRS does not comply with the
administrative requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, its summons
are unenforceable,” and therefore, “the 23-day notice requirement is
mandatory and an administrative requirement of the Internal Revenue
Code.” Id. at 1300–01.
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CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Appeals – Habeas Corpus: Collins v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742
F.3d 528 (3d Cir. 2014)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether “a claim of cumulative error must
be presented to the state courts before” seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 542–43. The court noted that the 5th Circuit determined that
“cumulative error relief is available so long as the individual errors were
themselves not procedurally defaulted,” while the 6th, 9th, and 10th
Circuits found that “cumulative error claims are distinct claims subject to
exhaustion and procedural default.” Id. at 542. The 3rd Circuit agreed
with the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuits in finding “that a claim of cumulative
error must be presented to the state courts before it may provide a basis for
habeas relief.” Id. at 543. Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that cumulative
error claims are subject to exhaustion and procedural default if not
presented in state court, thus precluding the claim on appeal. Id. at 542–
43.
Career Offender Enhancement – United States Sentencing
Guidelines: Whiteside v. United States, 748 F.3d 541 (4th Cir. 2014)
The 4th Circuit addressed “whether a federal inmate may use a 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion to challenge a sentence that was based on the career
offender enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“USSG”) when subsequent case law reveals the enhancement to be
inapplicable to him.” Id. at 543. The court noted that the 8th Circuit held
that a misapplication of career offender status “is not an error that results
in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 549 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court also noted that the 7th Circuit held errors related to
sentences issued under the mandatory Guidelines to be “less serious[,] and
that as long as the sentence imposed was beneath the statutory maximum
it was not subject to correction on collateral review.” Id. at 550 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that the 11th Circuit had
reached the opposite conclusion and held that “an erroneous career
offender enhancement amounts to a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
Id. The 4th Circuit agreed with the 11th Circuit’s reasoning, which in turn
had relied on the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements. Id. at 551.
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Thus, the 4th Circuit held that “an erroneous application of the career
offender enhancement amounts to a fundamental miscarriage of justice
that is cognizable on collateral review.” Id.
Fourth Amendment – Warrantless Searches: United States v. Noble,
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15279 (6th Cir. 2014)
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of “how to handle the
government’s professed waiver given that the consequence of this failure
is the suppression of evidence against a defendant whose rights were not
infringed.” Id. at *43. The court noted that the 1st and 8th Circuits “hold
that the government cannot waive the issue of Fourth Amendment
standing.” Id. However, the 3rd Circuit “holds that the government’s
failure to argue the standing issue before the district court represents a
waiver that fully extinguishes the argument, even if the government
catches its error on appeal.” Id. at *45. The 9th Circuit reasoned “that
when a defendant appeals the denial of a motion to suppress . . . the
defendant continues to bear the burden of showing that he has standing,
and absent reliance, the government- as the party without the burden of
persuasion- can raise the standing issue on appeal . . . however [the 9th
Circuit] will also treat the government’s failure to raise the standing issue
in its opening appellate brief as a waiver.” Id. at *46. The 6th Circuit
joined the majority of circuits and concluded “that the government can
forfeit and waive any objections to the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
standing.” Id. at *45.
Fugitive Disentitlement Statute – Criminal Prosecution: United States
v. Technodyne, 753 F. 3d 368 (2d Cir. 2014)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether, when a claimant under the
fugitive disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. §2466, declines to enter or
reenter the United States, the government is required to prove that his sole
purpose was the “avoidance of criminal prosecution.” Id. at 384. The
court noted that the D.C. Circuit determined that the government must
show that the avoidance of criminal prosecution is a claimant’s sole intent
for refusing to enter or reenter the United States, while the 9th Circuit
found that the sole motivating factor of a claimant causing him to remain
abroad need not be the desire to evade criminal prosecution. Id. The 2nd
Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit in finding that it is not a requirement
that a claimant’s desire to avoid criminal prosecution be the sole
motivating factor of his declining to enter or reenter the United States. Id.
The 2nd Circuit concluded that the sole intent of the claimant does not
have to be the avoidance of criminal prosecution, but if any of the
claimant’s motivations for declining to enter or reenter the United States
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is the avoidance of criminal prosecution, the intent standard specified in
the fugitive disentitlement statute is satisfied. Id. at 386.
Removal of Non-Citizens – Eligibility for Relief: Syblis v. AG of the
U.S., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15801 (3d Cir. 2014)
The 3rd Circuit addressed the issue of “whether an inconclusive
record of conviction is sufficient to satisfy a noncitizen’s burden to
demonstrate eligibility for relief from removal.” Id. at *17. The court
noted that the 4th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have held “that an
inconclusive record of conviction does not satisfy a noncitizen’s burden of
demonstrating eligibility for relief from removal.” Id. at *21. The court
also noted that the 2nd Circuit reached the opposite conclusion by
employing a “categorical approach” to find “that presentation of an
inconclusive record of conviction satisfies a noncitizen’s burden to
demonstrate that he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.” Id.
at *18. The court agreed with the 10th Circuit’s reasoning that “[t]he fact
that [the noncitizen] is not to blame for the ambiguity surrounding his
criminal conviction does not relieve him of his obligation to prove
eligibility for discretionary relief.” Id. The court departed from the 2nd
Circuit’s interpretation, noting that the 2nd Circuit failed to place the
appropriate burden on the noncitizen to demonstrate eligibility for relief.
Id. at *19. Thus, the 3rd Circuit joined the 4th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits
and held that an inconclusive record of conviction does not satisfy a
noncitizen’s burden of demonstrating eligibility for relief from removal.”
Id. at *21.
Sentencing – Armed Career Criminal Act: United States v. Prater, 2014
U.S. App. LEXIS 16889 (6th Cir. 2014)
The 6th Circuit addressed “whether a conviction for third-degree
burglary under New York law is categorically a violent felony for armedcareer-criminal purposes.” Id. at *39. The court noted that the 2nd and
3rd Circuits determined that a third-degree burglary under New York law
was a categorically violent felony under the residual clause. Id. at *37–
*38. The 6th Circuit disagreed with the 2nd and 3rd Circuits because those
courts “failed to apply the modified categorical approach, to treat the
offense as a divisible one, and even to acknowledge that the offense
encompassed alternative forms other than generic burglary.” Id. at *37.
Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that in order to determine whether a
conviction for third-degree burglary under New York law is a violent
felony for armed criminal purposes, a court must apply the modified
categorical approach in order to determine a violent felony under the
Armed Career Criminal Act. Id. at *1–*2.
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Sentencing – Resentencing Hearings: United States v. Alvarez, No. 1340812, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13938 (5th Cir. 2014)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether “resentencing hearings following
a remand are to be conducted de novo unless expressly limited by the court
in its order of remand” even when said remand was designed to fix a
“specific and defined sentencing error.” Id. at *9–*10. The 5th Circuit
noted that the D.C. and 7th Circuits determined resentencing hearings
which follow a remand need not adhere to this requirement. Id. The 5th
Circuit agreed with the D.C. and 7th Circuits’ position that resentencing
hearings on remand do not always have to be conducted de novo. Id at
*10. In following these circuits, the 5th Circuit acknowledged that it
adopts the minority position on the matter. Id at *9. Nevertheless, since
the Matthews factors, which would otherwise demand that a court conduct
de novo resentencing, do not appear in this case, the 5th Circuit found that
the general rule on sentencing controls, and concluded “that de novo
resentencing is improper following a remand for correction of a specific
and defined sentencing error.” Id.
Sentencing – Restitution: United States v. Farano, 749 F.3d 658 (7th
Cir. 2014)
The 7th Circuit addressed the method of calculating restitution when
the
victims
were
refinancing
banks under
18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(b)(1)(B)(i)(II). Id. at 666. Under the statute, the victim is entitled
to “the value of the [victim’s] property on the date of sentencing, less the
value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property
that is returned.” Id. The 7th Circuit noted that the 1st, 3rd, 8th, 10th, and
possibly the 5th Circuits determined that under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(b)(1)(B)(i)(II) the date the property sold is the proper calculation
for restitution, while the 5th and 9th Circuits held that the foreclosure date
is determinative. Id. The 7th Circuit agreed with the majority of the
Circuits and concluded that the date of foreclosure or later as the “choice
of the transaction date to use to measure the restitution.” Id. at 667. The
7th Circuit, however, found that “refinancing banks probably were not
victims” so the date to calculate restitution was irrelevant. Id. Thus the
7th Circuit concluded that the owners of the original mortgages, but not
the refinancing banks were entitled to restitution. Id.
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Sex Trafficking of Children – Sentencing Enhancement: United States
v. Pringler, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16481 (5th Cir. 2014)
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether the computer use enhancement
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3) applies to uses of the computer beyond the
scenarios mentioned in application note 4.” Id. at *14. The court noted
that the 4th and 11th Circuits “have found application note 4 inapplicable
and relied on the plain meaning of the Guideline alone in upholding
computer use sentencing enhancements under Subsection (3)(B),” while
the 3rd and 7th Circuits have “each applied application note 4” to the
subsection. Id. at *15–*17. The 5th Circuit agreed with the 4th and 11th
Circuits, finding that application note 4 “‘ignores the plain meaning’ of
the Guideline.” Id. at *16. The court disagreed with the 3rd and 7th
Circuits that application note 4 is authoritative. Id. at *17. Thus, the 5th
Circuit concluded that “application note 4 is inconsistent with Subsection
3(B),” and if they were to give “application note 4 controlling weight, it
would render Subsection 3(b) inoperable in all but a narrow subset of cases
under only one of the numerous criminal statutes the Guideline covers.”
Id. at *18.
CRIMINAL STATUTES
Hobbs Act – Overt Act Requirement: United States v. Salahuddin, 2014
U.S. App. LEXIS 17000 (3rd Cir. 2014)
The 3rd Circuit addressed the issue of “whether an overt act is a
required element of Hobbs Act conspiracy.” Id. at *12. The court noted
that the 1st, 2nd, and 11th Circuits determined that “an overt act is not a
required element of Hobbs Act conspiracy,” while the 5th Circuit “requires
an overt act for Hobbs Act conspiracy.” Id. at *17–*18. The 3rd Circuit
joined the 1st, 2nd and 11th Circuits, which do not require proof of an
overt act for a conviction in a Hobbs Act conspiracy. Id. at *19. The 3rd
Circuit additionally stated that since the Hobbs Act conspiracy makes no
mention of a required overt act, the 3rd Circuit decline to read in such
requirement. Id. at *16. Thus, the 3rd Circuit held that an overt act is not
a required element under a Hobbs Act conspiracy. Id. at *19.
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FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Witness – Lay Witness Testimony: United States v. Gadson, 2014 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15969 (9th Cir. 2014)
The 9th Circuit addressed Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which gives
guidance on what testimony by a layperson is admissible. The court noted
that both the D.C. and 2nd Circuits have applied this rule “much more
narrowly[,] and barred officers from interpreting intercepted
communications based on their review of the recordings and personal
involvement in an investigation.” Id. at *37–*38. The 9th Circuit
disagreed and found that “a lay witness’s opinion testimony necessarily
draws on the witness’s own understanding, including wealth of personal
information, experience, and education that cannot be placed before the
jury”, and that “if witnesses cannot draw on their experience and
knowledge, they are effectively limited to presenting factual information.”
Id. at *38–*39. The 9th Circuit joined the 1st Circuit and concluded that
“rule 701 did not impose such a limitation.” Id. at *39.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
Jurisdictional Dispute – Pre-Patent Inventorship: Camsoft Data Sys.,
Inc. v. S. Elec. Supply, Inc., 756 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2014)
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether a district court has jurisdiction
over an inventorship dispute where the contested patent has not yet
issued.” Id. at 330. The court noted that the Federal Circuit determined
that the “district court[s] . . . have jurisdiction over pre-patent inventorship
disputes but must dismiss until a patent has issued. Id. at 336. The 5th
Circuit disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s interpretation, reasoning
instead that “Congress has explicitly vested the Patent and Trademark
Office with sole discretion over the ‘granting and issuing of patents.’” Id.
at 334. The 5th Circuit noted, “[i]t seems like splitting jurisdictional hairs
to suggest that the federal courts entertain some kind of pending
jurisdiction over a dispute whose immediate resolution Congress
delegated to another forum.” Id. at 336. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded
that, “district courts have no jurisdiction over an inventorship dispute until
the disputed patent has issued.” Id. at 333.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Fourth Amendment – Third Party Consent to Searches: United
States v. Peyton, 745 F. 3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether ambiguity as to a third party’s
apparent authority to consent to searches should be viewed in a light most
favorable to the police or to the defendant. Id. at 555. The court noted
that the 6th Circuit determined that a third party does not have apparent
authority to consent to searches where there is an ambiguity as to whether
the area is one of mutual use. Id. at 554. The court recognized that the 2nd
and 7th Circuits found that the defendant bears the risk of uncertainty in
situations like these because a third party with common authority over the
premises is presumed to have authority over closed containers, unless the
police are positive that the third party does not. Id. The D.C. Circuit
agreed with the 6th Circuit in finding that ambiguity regarding mutual use
is enough to defeat apparent authority of third parties. Id. The court
disagreed with the 2nd and 7th Circuits as there was both ambiguity and
positive evidence that the third party had apparent authority to grant a
search. Id. Thus the D.C. Circuit concluded that evidence seized with the
permission of a third party must be suppressed. Id. at 556.
SENTENCING
Enhancement Applications – 18 U.S.C. § 924(e): United States v.
Barbour, 750 F.3d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 2014)
The 6th Circuit addressed the meaning of “committed on occasions
different from one another” within the statute. Id. at 539. The court noted
that the 7th Circuit has addressed this issue and determined that there was
no subjective element in the determination, and that the burden falls to the
government to show that one crime began before the conclusion of the
other. Id. at 542. The 11th Circuit also supported this proposition. Id.
at 544. This approach differed, however, from that of the 9th and the 5th
Circuits, which each held that the burden was instead on the defendant. Id.
at 545 Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that the burden of determining
whether two crimes were committed on different occasions for purposes
of sentencing falls on the government, relying on the reasoning of the 7th
Circuit’s analysis. Id. at 543.
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Enhancement Applications – Causation Standard for Death
Occurring During Commission of a Crime: United States v. RamosDelgado, No. 13-40367, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12359 (5th Cir. 2014)
The 5th Circuit addressed “what causation is required under [United
States Sentencing Guidelines] § 2L1.1(b)(7) when an injury or death
occurs during the commission of a crime.” Id. at *4. While the 5th Circuit
had not dealt with the issue before, the 8th and 9th Circuits held that the
Guidelines require “direct or proximate causation. Id. The 10th and 11th
Circuits, on the other hand, have rejected a requirement of proximate
causation because “[t]he guideline contains no causation requirement and
we have no license to impose one.” Id. at *4–*5. The 5th Circuit agreed
with the 10th and 11th Circuits, and determined that “the only causation
requirement is that contained in § 1B1.3, which describes the general
relevant conduct that may be considered in determining the guideline
range.” Id. at *5. The 5th Circuit noted that “relevant conduct includes
“all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsections
(a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and
omissions.” Id. The 5th Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause the ordinary
meaning of ‘resulted from’ imposes a requirement of actual or but-for
causation and textual and contextual reasons do not justify the use of an
alternative causation, we conclude that—unless otherwise specified—the
defendant’s relevant conduct must be a but-for cause of a harm for that
harm to be considered in assigning the guideline range.” Id. at *5, *7.
Probation Dispositions – Revoking Supervised Release: United States
v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014)
The 11th Circuit addressed “whether it is error to consider a factor
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when imposing a sentence after
revoking supervised release.” Id. at 1308. The court noted that the 1st,
2nd, 3rd, and 6th Circuits held it is not error, while the 4th, 5th, and 9th
Circuits held that it is error. Id. at 1309. The 11th Circuit agreed with the
4th, 5th, and 9th Circuits, stating that “because it is impermissible to
consider rehabilitation, a court errs by relying on or considering
rehabilitation in any way when sentencing a defendant to prison.” Id. at
1311. When rejecting the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Circuit’s reasoning, the 11th
Circuit stated “we believe our sister Circuits have taken an unnecessary
narrow view.” Id. Thus, the 11th Circuit concluded, “a district court errs
when it considers rehabilitation when imposing or lengthening a sentence
of imprisonment.” Id. at 1310.
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Restitution – Calculation: United States v. Holmich, 563 F. App’x 483
(7th Cir. 2014)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether restitution is to be considered a
civil or criminal penalty. Id. at 485. The court noted that the majority of
Circuits have determined that restitution is a criminal penalty, while only
the 8th and 10th Circuits have found it is civil in nature. Id. The 7th
Circuit agreed with the 8th and 10th Circuits in finding that the amount of
restitution ordered did not need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
after being charged in the indictment Id. at 485. The court disagreed with
the majority of the Circuits, pointing to its holding in U.S. v. Wolfe 701
F.3d 1206 (7th Cir. 2012), where the court rejected the argument that the
Supreme Court’s holding in Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132
S.Ct. 2344 (2012) had established restitution as criminal in nature. Id.
Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded restitution is civil in nature, and therefore
amounts determined and ordered are not required to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 485.
SENTENCING JUVENILES
Review of Writ of Habeas Corpus Denial for Imposed Adult Criminal
Sentences on Juveniles – AEDPA: Goins v. Smith, 556 F. App’x 434 (6th
Cir. 2014)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether sentencing a juvenile as an adult
for 84-years for a non-homicidal crime constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment and whether the reversal
of a denial of a writ of habeas corpus is warranted. Id. at 436–37. The
Court noted that the 9th Circuit held that a 254 year sentence imposed on
a juvenile non-homicide offender was improper because such a sentence
was “materially indistinguishable” from a life sentence without parole. Id.
at 437. In contrast, the 5th Circuit decided that a 45 year sentence for a
juvenile convicted of conspiracy to use a firearm in relation to a crime of
violence that resulted in death was not an Eighth Amendment violation
and permissible. Id. The 6th Circuit held, consistent with the 5th Circuit,
that an 84-year sentence imposed on a juvenile was not cruel or unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment based on the circumstances of
the juvenile’s actions and that the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality
requirement does not demand consideration of juvenile status. Id. 434.
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Prior Convictions Constituting Violent Felonies – ACCA Sentencing:
United States v. Chandler, 743 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 2014)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a conviction for conspiracy is
considered a violent felony when sentencing under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”) for an individual who enters a guilty plea for
possession of a firearm. Id. at 649. The Court recognized that the 1st, 3rd,
4th, 5th, and 8th Circuits have held that conspiracy may qualify as a violent
felony. Id. at 661. While the 10th and 11th Circuits have stated that
conspiracy does not qualify as a violent felony reasoning that the overt act
required to be found guilty of conspiracy, does not alone, provide evidence
that a violent crime has yet to occur. Id. at 662. The 9th Circuit joined the
1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th Circuits in holding that conspiracy is considered
a violent felony for the purposes of enhanced sentencing under the ACCA.
Id.

